



Prior k-anonymity via insensitive microaggregation to reduce data utility loss when achieving ϵ -differential privacy in data releases

Insensitive microaggregation




Information loss ($k=1$ is standard diff. privacy, ϵ from 0.01 to 10)



Construction to achieve t-closeness and ϵ -differential privacy

Partition of the data set into groups P1, P2, P3... by the quasi-identifiers and bucketization of the confidential attribute to achieve t-closeness



- ◆ The granularity of confidential attribute is reduced, so t-closeness is achieved with distance

$$d(\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2) = \max_S \left\{ \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_1}(S)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_2}(S)}, \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_2}(S)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_1}(S)} \right\}$$

where \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 are two random distributions differing in one record and S is an arbitrary set.

- ◆ For uninformed intruders, such t-closeness implies ϵ -differential privacy with $\epsilon = \ln(t)$:

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{D}_1}(S) \leq \exp(\epsilon) \times \Pr_{\mathcal{D}_2}(S)$$

where \mathcal{D}_1 is the distribution of the confidential attribute in the whole protected data set and \mathcal{D}_2 is the distribution of the confidential attribute in the group P_i containing a specific individual.

From ϵ -differential privacy to expected t-closeness

Let X be an original data set and X' be a corresponding anonymized data set such that its quasi-identifiers are k-anonymous and the projection of X' on the confidential attributes is ϵ -differentially private. Then X' satisfies expected t-closeness with

$$t = g^{-1}(\exp((N - k) \times \epsilon))$$

Hence, a greedy way to achieve actual t-closeness is to keep generating ϵ -differentially private versions of the confidential attribute until a t-close version is found.

Conclusions

The k-anonymity, t-closeness and differential privacy models are connected. Using a prior k-anonymization step based on insensitive microaggregation allows achieving differential privacy in data set releases with less utility loss. Also, $\exp(\epsilon)$ -closeness implies ϵ -differential privacy for uninformed intruders in data releases. Finally, k-Anonymity for quasi-identifiers combined with ϵ -differential privacy for confidential attributes yields t-closeness in expectation, with $t=f(k,\epsilon)$.

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